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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The National Association for Public Defense
(NAPD) is an association of more than 14,000 public
defenders and other professionals who have sought to
ensure that indigent clients secure their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.* NAPD
members are advocates in jails, courtrooms, and communities, as well as experts in best practices and the
practical, day-to-day representation of criminal defendants. Their collective expertise represents state,
county, and local systems through full-time, contract,
and assigned-counsel delivery mechanisms, dedicated
juvenile, capital, and appellate offices, and a diversity
of traditional and holistic practice models. The NAPD
has a deep interest in the correct interpretation of
laws and constitutional provisions affecting the rights
of criminal defendants—particularly defendants who
cannot afford to hire private counsel.
As a national organization, the NAPD is committed to ensuring that the Fourth Amendment is interpreted correctly and consistently throughout the
United States. It agrees with petitioner that courts in
state and federal jurisdictions across the country, like
the Third Circuit in this case, have erred in denying
individuals their constitutional right to a reasonable
* Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus curiae states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole
or in part, and no party or counsel for a party, or any person other
than amicus curiae or its counsel, made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.2, counsel for amicus curiae states that counsel
for petitioner and respondent received timely notice of intent to
file this brief. All parties have consented in writing to the filing
of this brief.
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expectation of privacy merely because they are not
listed as authorized drivers on rental-car agreements.
Pet. 15–18, 27–34. This approach both defies widely
shared social expectations and misconstrues state
law. It also disproportionately affects Americans who
lack the resources to own property in their own
names. Certiorari should be granted.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
More than two centuries after it was ratified, the
Fourth Amendment continues to protect the “right of
the people to be secure” from “unreasonable searches.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Modern technological advances and social developments do not render our
rights “any less worthy of the protection for which the
Founders fought.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,
2494–95 (2014). This Court plays an essential role in
ensuring that the Fourth Amendment retains its vitality as an indispensable safeguard of liberty, even as
Americans dramatically change the ways they organize their everyday affairs.
This case calls for the Court to play that role once
again. The lower courts have sharply diverged over
whether a driver of a rental car whose name is not
listed on the rental agreement can have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the car—a frequently recurring issue, because police commonly treat a driver’s
use of a rental car as a basis for reasonable suspicion
to justify a traffic stop. See, e.g., State v. Adan, 886
N.W.2d 841, 847 (N.D. 2016). As a result of this split,
the location where a person is driving at the time of a
traffic stop could determine whether he has a Fourth
Amendment right to privacy in a rental car. This
Court has provided little guidance to date on the scope
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of the Fourth Amendment rights of those who use
property that someone else has rented. This case offers an opportunity to clear away the confusion about
the Fourth Amendment’s scope in a society that uses
rental cars with increasing frequency.
I. The rising reliance of Americans (especially the
economically disadvantaged) on car rentals supports
this Court’s review. The ascendance of the “sharing
economy” has highlighted that more people than ever
rent rather than own the key instrumentalities of life,
whether out of personal preference or financial necessity. This case presents an opportunity to provide
needed guidance to the deeply divided lower courts on
the Fourth Amendment rights of non-owners—particularly rental-car drivers whose names have not been
added to rental contracts. As the petition ably explains, this issue recurs with great frequency, and it
has sharply divided state and federal courts nationwide. Pet. 19–24. The Court should not allow the
Fourth Amendment rights of rental-car drivers to depend on jurisdictional happenstance, especially in
light of the inherent mobility of motor vehicles. See,
e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
II. The rule applied by the court of appeals below
is wrong and systematically underprotects the privacy
rights of rental-car drivers. To assert an expectation
of privacy that “society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable,’” it is not necessary to have a formal property interest in the area searched. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see Pet. 32–34. Even if such an interest were
required, it is far from obvious that the Third Circuit
applied such a requirement correctly. In many jurisdictions, an unlisted rental-car driver who has the
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renter’s permission has a property or possessory interest in the car, along with the rights and duties accompanying that interest. And many courts routinely
decline to enforce the prohibitions on unlisted drivers
contained in many rental-car contracts. The court of
appeals’ rule is therefore unsound regardless of how
one tests the reasonableness of a driver’s expectation
of privacy.
ARGUMENT
This case poses the question whether a rental-car
driver who has the renter’s, but not the owner’s, permission to use the car can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Pet. i. This question is
plainly suitable for certiorari under this Court’s traditional standards, as the petition explains, because it
is the subject of an entrenched disagreement among
several federal courts of appeals and state courts of
last resort. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). But it also demands
resolution in light of the increasing prevalence of car
rentals in the United States, as well as their particular importance in poorer communities.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF OUR NATION’S RENTAL
ECONOMY SUPPORTS CERTIORARI.
Car and other property rentals play an increasingly important role in our economic and social life.
Although rentals are nothing new, in recent years
Americans have been renting cars, housing, and other
property at increasing rates and under arrangements
that were not even possible just 10 or 20 years ago.
Economically disadvantaged individuals in particular
frequently use rentals and similar arrangements to
mitigate or escape the cycle of poverty. Merits aside,
this case calls for review to clarify the privacy rights
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of the many millions of Americans who now rely on
rented cars and other property—even if they are not
formally listed as drivers or other users in the relevant rental agreements.
A. Car Rentals Play a Critical and
Increasingly Prominent Role in
American Life.
We are a car-dependent society. In sharp contrast
to our pre-automobile ancestors, who would rarely
venture more than a handful of miles beyond their
homes, today more than 86 percent of U.S. workers
commute by car. U.S. Census Bureau, Who Drives to
Work? Commuting by Automobile in the United States:
2013, at 2 (2015), https://goo.gl/ND5QSy.
Just as automobiles changed the way commuters
and others get where they need to go, technological
and cultural developments have changed the way people access automobiles. In large part due to the rise
of the modern “sharing economy,” Americans increasingly “rent their cars, instead of buying them.” Matt
Phillips, Why More and More Americans Are Renting
Cars Instead of Buying Them, Quartz (June 2, 2014),
https://goo.gl/sDUWVP. This trend is emblematic of a
broader social shift. “Instead of buying and owning
things, consumers want access to goods and prefer to
pay for the experience of temporarily accessing them.
Ownership is no longer the ultimate expression of consumer desire.” Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt,
Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing,
39 J. Consumer Res. 881, 881 (2012) (citation omitted). “Collaborative Consumption is not a niche trend,
and it’s not a reactionary blip to the 2008 global financial crisis. It’s a growing movement with millions of
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people participating from all corners of the world.”
Rachel Botsman & Roo Rogers, What’s Mine Is Yours:
The Rise of Collaborative Consumption xvi (2010).
For example, “car sharing” allows consumers to
“temporarily gain access to cars,” often using a mobilephone or online application, “in return for a membership fee.” Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra, at 881. Over the
past decade or so, car sharing has led to a dramatic
increase in the number of Americans using cars that
they do not own. See id. at 886 (“car sharing is a popular alternative to car ownership and has grown systematically in the United States, where the revenue
from car-sharing programs is expected to be $3.3 billion in 2016, up from $253 million in 2009”).
This trend has magnified economically disadvantaged communities’ preexisting reliance on rental
cars. Despite the importance of automobiles to life
and livelihood, many Americans simply cannot afford
to purchase a car. Twenty-four percent of households
in poverty do not own a vehicle, and low-income populations are twice as likely to travel in multi-occupant
vehicles, through car sharing and carpooling. National Household Travel Survey, Mobility Challenges
for Households in Poverty 2 (2014), https://goo.gl/
U7PBwn. Frequently, members of low-income households rent cars or “borrow[] them from neighbors,
friends, or relatives.” John Pucher & John L. Renne,
Socioeconomics of Urban Travel: Evidence from the
2001 NHTS, 57 Transport. Q. 49, 57 (2003). Indeed,
empirical data show that minorities tend to rent cars
at higher rates. Kevin Neels, Effects of Discriminatory Excise Taxes on Car Rentals: Unintentional Impacts on Minorities, Low Income Households, and
Auto Purchases 4–5 & tbl. 2 (2010).
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These patterns are a critical part of the sharing
economy, which consists largely of social networks
that low-income individuals use to survive and eventually break the cycle of poverty. See, e.g., Silvia
Dominguez & Celeste Watkins, Creating Networks for
Survival and Mobility: Social Capital Among AfricanAmerican and Latin-American Low-Income Mothers,
50 Soc. Probs. 111 (2003). By pooling resources and
support, individuals can leverage their networks to increase socioeconomic mobility. Id. at 124. “Low-income communities frequently pool resources in order
to maximize them. Anchored in strong social networks
and the collective mindset of low-income individuals,
this practice is at the core of collective assets and casual lending with relaxed reciprocity.” Edna R.
Sawady & Jennifer Tescher, Financial Decision Making Processes of Low-Income Individuals 9 (2008),
https://goo.gl/d6jJOq.
The rise of the sharing economy, together with the
existing importance of rental cars to poorer Americans, has resulted in the proliferation of shared rental
cars among low-income and minority households.
Thus, among the Americans who increasingly rely on
rental cars today are many members of our society’s
most disadvantaged groups.
Whether they realize it or not, people who sign
agreements with traditional rental-car companies or
who click “accept” on their mobile phone when presented with the terms of modern car-sharing services
have bought into restrictions on who may drive the
car. See, e.g., Zipcar, Rules of Vehicle Use § 1 (Jan. 1,
2017), https://goo.gl/ftvGXC (“Non-Members are expressly prohibited from driving a Zipcar vehicle at any

8
time.”). But “[f]ew people actually read” these provisions. Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels?: Article 2A, Standardized Rental Car Terms, Rational Inaction, and
Unilateral Private Ordering, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 135,
136 (2006). As detailed below, contractual restrictions
about who may operate rental cars have resulted in a
conflict among the lower courts on the proper application of the Fourth Amendment.
B. The Court Should Clarify the Fourth
Amendment Rights of Users of Rented
Vehicles.
The dramatic social trend toward the use of rentals
and the increased reliance on the sharing economy
make it especially important that the Court clarify the
Fourth Amendment rights of non-owners. The Court
should grant certiorari to resolve a deep lower-court
split over whether a rental-car driver may challenge
an unlawful vehicle search when it turns out that the
renter did not add the driver’s name to the rental
agreement. See Pet. 11–19.
The Court plays a critical role in clarifying how the
Fourth Amendment applies to new technologies, having repeatedly enforced the Fourth Amendment in
light of new technological developments. See, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding
that the use of “sense-enhancing technology” to view
the interior of a home invades a reasonable expectation of privacy); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746
(2010) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages sent through a city
department–issued pager); United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding that attaching a GPS
tracker to the bottom of a car constitutes a search);
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Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding
that police must have a warrant before accessing cell
phone data).
The Court has also ensured that its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence keeps pace with new social
developments. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (holding that a middle school’s strip search of a student suspected of possessing contraband violated the Fourth Amendment);
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that helicopter surveillance 400 feet above a defendant’s
greenhouse did not constitute a search in part because
the aircraft’s flight was in compliance with FAA regulations). The Court has accordingly stressed the importance of “the everyday expectations of privacy that
we all share,” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98
(1990), and focused on what “society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable,’” Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Despite the rise of the rental economy, the Court
has provided little guidance on the Fourth Amendment rights of non-owners. To be sure, the reasoning
in the Court’s most relevant cases helps demonstrate
that the Third Circuit’s decision here is wrong. In
cases involving the Fourth Amendment rights of overnight houseguests and hotel guests, for example, the
Court has established that a person can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place even in the
absence of any formal ownership interest. See, e.g.,
Olson, 495 U.S. at 100 (holding that an overnight
guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy without
needing absolute control over the home); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (holding that a
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warrantless search of a defendant’s hotel room without consent was unlawful even if the hotel clerk consented). These cases only go so far, however, in clarifying whether an unlisted rental-car driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
As a result of the extensive lower-court split on the
question presented, Pet. 11–19, a motorist’s Fourth
Amendment rights can vary depending on which
State she happens to be driving in. For example, a
resident of Colorado City, Arizona can borrow a
friend’s rental car without sacrificing her expectation
of privacy, but only if she takes care to avoid driving
over the line that splits her town between Arizona and
Utah. In some jurisdictions, the applicable rule even
depends on whether the driver is charged by federal
or state prosecutors in the event wrongdoing is uncovered. Pet. 20–21. “[P]olice enforcement practices”
may “vary from place to place and from time to time,”
but this Court has refused to “accept that the search
and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are
so variable and can be made to turn upon such trivialities.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815
(1996); accord Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171–
72 (2008). Particularly when a case involves automobiles, which can and do move from place to place with
ease, national uniformity in the interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment is critical to ensuring fair treatment and upholding the rule of law.
This lack of clarity is especially problematic because, as discussed above, rental cars are critically important to underprivileged communities. As Justice
Sotomayor explained last Term, a more restrictive
view of the Fourth Amendment’s protections has a disproportionately harmful effect on minorities and other
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disadvantaged groups. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct.
2056, 2068–71 (2016) (dissenting opinion); see also,
e.g., Amelia L. Diedrich, Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of the Poverty
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 39 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 297, 317 (2011) (“Residents of poor neighborhoods are more frequently subject to searches of
their person in the form of overly aggressive stop and
frisk tactics.”). Car rentals’ increasing popularity and
prominent place in economically disadvantaged communities give this case added urgency, amplifying its
suitability for certiorari under this Court’s traditional
standards.
*

*

*

This case would be an ideal candidate for review in
any context: It squarely presents an important, recurring question of constitutional law that has divided
the lower courts. Certiorari is particularly appropriate, however, in light of the important function rental
cars serve in today’s society.
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S DECISION MISAPPLIES THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND MISCONSTRUES
PROPERTY LAW.
This case is also an ideal vehicle because the Third
Circuit’s approach exemplifies how numerous lower
courts have erroneously denied unlisted rental-car
drivers the opportunity to assert their Fourth Amendment rights. First, the court of appeals’ approach contravenes this Court’s Fourth Amendment case law by
erroneously making a boilerplate rental-car contract
almost entirely dispositive of whether a driver has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Sec-
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ond, even if this inquiry could be distilled to an analysis of the driver’s formal legal rights in the vehicle,
the Third Circuit’s reasoning rests on a mistaken view
of the common law of property. Third, courts commonly decline to enforce rental-agreement restrictions on unlisted drivers, revealing the illogic of
conditioning constitutional rights on contractual provisions that often have no effect.
A. The Third Circuit’s Rule Runs Afoul of
Core Fourth Amendment Principles.
This Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence eschews bright-line rules to determine whether a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly
rules that depend on the arcana of state law. But one
would never know it from reading the Third Circuit’s
opinions on the privacy rights of unlisted rental-car
drivers.
In United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.
2011)—the case that governed the outcome here—the
Third Circuit held that a driver not listed on a rental
agreement almost always lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car. The court held that
“as a general rule,” an unlisted driver “lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car unless there exist extraordinary circumstances suggesting an expectation of privacy.” Id. at 165. It reasoned that “the
lack of a cognizable property interest in the rental vehicle and the accompanying right to exclude make[] it
generally unreasonable for an unauthorized driver to
expect privacy in the vehicle.” Id. at 167. Indeed, the
Third Circuit has never found the “extraordinary circumstances” proviso applicable. In this case and others, it has instead treated Kennedy’s holding as akin
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to a per se rule, applying it with scant analysis of the
factual circumstances. See, e.g., Pet. App. 13a–14a;
United States v. Mebrtatu, 543 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d
Cir. 2013); United States v. Norman, 465 F. App’x 110,
116 n.9 (3d Cir. 2012). The only circumstances it has
recognized as an exception are “truly unique” and extremely narrow—such as when the unlisted driver is
married to the renter, “personally contacted the rental
car company” to make the reservation, and “reserved
the vehicle in his name, using his own credit card.”
Kennedy, 638 F.3d at 165, 168 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (discussing United States v. Smith,
263 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2001)).
This is not how the Fourth Amendment is supposed to work. “[F]or the most part per se rules are
inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context.”
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002); see
also, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177
(1984) (“No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth
Amendment that a place should be free of government
intrusion not authorized by warrant.”). Although
courts are inclined to provide clear guidance, they
must be careful in this area not to devise rigid rules
that disregard meaningful differences among cases.
See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968)
(“The constitutional validity of a warrantless search is
preeminently the sort of question which can only be
decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case.”); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (“There is no formula for the
determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances.”).
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Furthermore, a person’s “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment” does not depend on
his ability to assert a formal “property right in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978). Instead, “[l]egitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.” Id. at 143 n.12
(emphases added); see also, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 414
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[E]ven in the absence of
a trespass, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when
the government violates a subjective expectation of
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court has therefore recognized that people can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas they have no legal right
to control. See, e.g., Olson, 495 U.S. at 100 (overnight
guest).
The approach of the Third Circuit (and the other
courts aligned with it) is inconsistent with these principles. For one, this approach glosses over consequential differences among cases by dismissing the privacy
expectations of almost any rental-car driver who lacks
the rental company’s permission. The Third Circuit’s
rule treats people who use rental cars with the
renters’ permission—an exceedingly common practice
in society—the same way it treats those who use
rental cars with no permission at all. See Pet. 33–34
(noting that petitioner’s operation of the rental car
was not wrongful in any criminal sense); see also, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 59 N.E.3d 394, 402
(Mass. 2016) (“A renter’s decision to allow a person
who is not a permitted driver according to the rental
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agreement to drive a rental vehicle may be a breach of
that agreement, but it does not also result in a violation of criminal law.”). In fact, the Third Circuit has
relied on Kennedy in holding that “the possessor of a
stolen vehicle lacks standing to challenge a search of
the vehicle.” United States v. White, 504 F. App’x 168,
171–72 (2012).
The Third Circuit also ignores how society views
innocuous usage of rental cars by unlisted drivers.
Numerous courts have recognized how common it is
for individuals not listed on rental agreements to
drive rental cars. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 679 So. 2d 129, 132 (La. Ct. App.
1996) (“[W]hen there is a general, broad admonition
not to let anyone else drive the car” or even an “express prohibition against third drivers,” it is “reasonably foreseeable” that “the permittee would allow
someone else to drive the car.”). Many have acknowledged that the likelihood of unlisted drivers using
rental cars is “exceedingly great,” calling the practice
“foreseeable,” Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp. v.
Cont’l Nat’l Am. Grp. Co., 319 N.E.2d 182, 184 (N.Y.
1974), and a “common scenario,” Thrifty Car Rental,
Inc. v. Crowley, 677 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. 1998); see also Chandler v. Geico Indem.
Co., 78 So. 3d 1293, 1299 (Fla. 2011) (“a bailee or lessee of a rented automobile, similarly as its owner, may
permit another to operate it (and often does).” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Cutler, 159
P.3d 909, 912 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (noting “the increasingly common utilization of rental vehicles for a
myriad of purposes”). Use of a rental car by an unlisted driver is “in the very nature of modern automobile use.” Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 3,
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6–7 (Fla. 1972). Kennedy thus got it exactly backwards when it characterized sharing of rental cars as
a sinister, “deceptive” act rather than what it really
is: “a largely harmless and even expected occurrence
that can be easily managed by the owner.” 638 F.3d
at 167 (seeking to draw contrast with renters who return their vehicles late).
The fine print of a private contract of adhesion
“cannot control the paramount constitutional question” whether a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy. United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150
(10th Cir. 1986). Although they can certainly be a relevant factor, a defendant’s formal legal rights in relation to a given location are rarely dispositive of
whether he reasonably expects that place to be open
for “public inspection.” California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 41 (1988); see also, e.g., United States v.
Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1999) (“lack of
ownership is not dispositive”). The Third Circuit’s approach conflicts with this Court’s Fourth Amendment
precedent and cannot be sustained.
B. Unlisted Drivers Can Have Cognizable
Property Interests in Rental Cars.
The Court has warned that Fourth Amendment
protections should not hinge on “arcane distinctions
developed in property” law, Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143,
but the Third Circuit’s test is even worse: It hinges on
a misunderstanding of property law. Under the common and statutory law of many jurisdictions, it is
simply untrue that “an unauthorized driver has no
cognizable property interest in the rental vehicle.”
Kennedy, 638 F.3d at 165. To the contrary, in a number of States a person who drives a rental car with the
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renter’s permission has legal rights and duties that
arise from that temporary control of the car. See, e.g.,
Hall v. State, 477 S.E.2d 364, 366 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
(unlisted rental-car driver’s “use of the car created a
bailment”). When it comes to the question of who is
an “authorized” driver, the property law in these
States does what the Third Circuit’s approach does
not—it accounts for the substantial difference between a driver who has the renter’s permission to use
the car and someone who has no permission at all.
State law often defines the contours of property interests protected by the Constitution. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
(“Property interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather they are created … from an independent source such as state law.”); Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction
80 (1998) (“[S]tate law typically defines the property
rights given constitutional protection against federal
officials.”). Bailment law governs the rights and obligations of persons who receive possession of an item,
such as a car, from someone who has permission to
use the item from the owner. Such persons are referred to as “permittees,” “sub-permittees,” “bailees,”
or “sub-bailees.”
At common law, anyone who acquired possession
of an item, whether with the ultimate owner’s permission or not, was required “to be diligent, to keep the
chattel as his own,” or be liable to the owner. Samuel
Stoljar, The Early History of Bailment, 1 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 5, 22 (1957). Further, anyone who acquired such
liability also had the corresponding right to exclude
others and, for a limited period, obtained sole custody
and control of the item. Albert S. Thayer, Possession,
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18 Harv. L. Rev. 196, 206 (1905) (“If a bailee intends
to exclude strangers to the title, it is enough for possession under the law, although he is perfectly ready
to give the thing up to its owner at any moment.” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., State v. Sanders, 614
P.2d 998, 1000, 1004 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing
a sub-permittee’s possessory interest in a car). Accordingly, some States hold a sub-bailee, a bailee, and
the owner all equally liable for negligence. See, e.g.,
Pabon v. InterAmerican Car Rental, Inc., 715 So. 2d
1148, 1150 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998).
With the development of automobiles and rental
vehicles, States have built an array of doctrines on top
of this common-law background to regulate sub-bailees. Several jurisdictions treat undisclosed drivers of
rental cars as foreseeable contingencies and permit
additional drivers to retain possessory interests in
rental cars while they are driving them. In New York,
for example, rental-car agencies are considered to
have “constructively” consented to additional drivers
for certain purposes despite contractual provisions restricting use of the vehicle to the renter and his immediate family. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp.,
319 N.E.2d at 184. These jurisdictions reason that
rental-car companies “kn[o]w or certainly should …
know[] that the probabilities [of] vehicles coming into
the hands of another person are entirely too great” to
treat an unlisted driver as a legal nonentity. Ibid.; cf.
United States v. Little, 945 F. Supp. 79, 83 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (agreeing “that if the driver of a rental car has
the permission of the lessee to drive the vehicle, then
he has a legitimate possessory interest”). Similarly,
in California, “specific admonition[s] not to permit anyone else to drive” are inapplicable where “the owner
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has committed the general use of the car to the permittee,” as in the case of rentals. 8 Cal. Jur. 3d Automobiles § 529 (“The owner of a motor vehicle is responsible for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions
by a subpermittee even though the subpermittee operated the owner’s vehicle with authorization only
from the permittee … .”). Florida law is similar. See,
e.g., Chandler, 78 So. 3d at 1297 (rental-car companies
“in actuality intrust[] th[e] automobile to the renter
for all ordinary purposes for which an automobile is
rented,” and unauthorized drivers do not change this
relationship regardless of “[t]he restrictions agreed
upon”); see also Campbell, 59 N.E.3d at 400 (“authorization to use a rental vehicle may be provided by
renters as well as by the rental company in at least
some circumstances”).
These States’ recognition of unlisted drivers’ possessory interests coheres with the property-law analysis in other contexts. In a recent Fourth Amendment
case, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the organizers of an event at a warehouse had a cognizable
possessory interest (and thus a reasonable expectation of privacy) in the warehouse because they received the permission of the sublessee to use the facility. Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1189
(2015).
The Third Circuit’s blithe assertion that “an unauthorized driver has no cognizable property interest in
the rental vehicle,” Kennedy, 638 F.3d at 165, ignores
the property-law principles governing sub-bailments
and similar arrangements. So even if formal property
rights were dispositive of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the court of appeals’ approach is on
unsteady ground.
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C. The Rental-Contract Terms Forming the
Basis for the Third Circuit’s Ruling Have
Been Rejected as Unenforceable.
Courts that do not recognize the reasonableness of
an unlisted rental-car driver’s expectation of privacy
base their conclusion largely on the rental contract’s
prohibition of unlisted drivers. See, e.g., United States
v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 886 (10th Cir. 1990) (no reasonable expectation of privacy for an unlisted driver
because “[t]he rental contract provided that the car
could only be driven by the lessee”). But courts consistently refuse to enforce those clauses in the very
context in which they are intended to apply—insurance coverage.
Rental-car companies rely on unlisted-driver prohibitions “as a basis for negating omnibus [insurance]
coverage which otherwise would have been available
to the lessee or his forbidden permittees.” Irvin E.
Schermer & William J. Schermer, 1 Automobile Liability Insurance § 6:18 (4th ed. 2008). But “a substantial number of courts” have “refused to permit a violation of the prohibition” to negate that insurance coverage. Ibid.; see also Boudreaux v. ABC Ins. Co., 689
F.2d 1256, 1261 (5th Cir. 1982) (unlisted driver “was
covered” by the contract’s insurance clause because
“he had permission from the named” driver “to drive
the automobile,” despite the rental contract’s prohibition of unlisted drivers); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 350 N.E.2d 616, 617 (N.Y. 1976) (per curiam)
(“recogniz[ing]” the “realities and exigencies of commercial automobile rentals”); “Permissive” Use of Automobile—Delegation of Permission to Second Permittee, 17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 409, § 11 (1992)
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(“courts in many jurisdictions tend to ignore express
prohibitions against delegation”).
Legal doctrines like “implied consent,” “lawful possession,” and “initial permission” “defang” the contractual prohibition on unlisted drivers in the insurance-coverage context. Schermer & Schermer, supra,
§ 6:18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
courts have held that a “person may be in lawful possession of an automobile if he is given possession by
someone using the automobile with the express permission of the owner, even though” the rental contract
prohibits unlisted drivers. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Aetna
Life & Cas. Co., 362 S.E.2d 836, 840 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987). And when a renter gives permission to an unlisted driver to operate the rental car, “subsequent use
short of actual conversion or theft” is “permissive.”
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Sys., Inc., 359 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts have reasoned that prohibiting unlisted
drivers from operating rental cars with the renter’s
permission would nullify an essential “purpose” of the
rental car for which the renter had bargained. BATS,
Inc. v. Shikuma, 617 P.2d 575, 577 (Haw. Ct. App.
1980) (per curiam) (insured was still “using” the
rental vehicle even when an unlisted driver was returning it, despite the rental contract’s unlisteddriver prohibition). “Rental of an automobile is for a
broad, almost unfettered, use,” including having unlisted drivers operate the vehicle. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 883 S.W.2d 530,
533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
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Some courts have concluded that rental-car companies must anticipate that unlisted drivers will operate their rental cars, and so must not actually intend to enforce the prohibition. It is “foreseeable and
inevitable” that some rental vehicles “will be operated
in violation of a restrictive lease agreement.” Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 49 A.D.2d 613, 614 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1975), modified, 350 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1976).
Rental-car companies do “not have a reasonable basis
for believing that” driver restrictions will “be carried
out,” and therefore are “deemed to have given implied
permission to the use of the subject automobile without the said restriction.” Fin. Indem. Co. v. Hertz
Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 249, 254 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)
(affirming district court’s findings).
This widespread rejection of unlisted-driver restrictions in rental-car contracts further undermines
the Third Circuit’s already wobbly rule. Courts often
refuse to enforce such provisions, largely on the basis
that rental companies are well aware that renters routinely allow unlisted persons to drive the rental vehicle. There can be no basis for inferring that those
same, largely null contract clauses deprive unlisted
drivers of their constitutionally protected expectation
of privacy.
*

*

*

As this Court made clear in Rakas, Fourth
Amendment protections do not depend on “arcane distinctions developed in property” law. 439 U.S. at 143.
And this makes good sense: Courts take a variety of
often conflicting approaches in the context of rental
vehicles. Americans’ reasonable expectations of privacy do not hinge on which property test a given court
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might use. Instead, social conceptions of reasonableness can establish an expectation of privacy protected
by the Constitution. Here, the Third Circuit—following the lead of several other courts—erred in holding
that neither strand of this Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence permitted petitioner to challenge the
search at issue.
CONCLUSION
This Court’s review is warranted to clarify the
Fourth Amendment rights of unlisted rental-car
drivers.
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